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Abstract: This paper aims to characterize how was the treatment for the outward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) within the Brazilian and South Korean development 
standards. In this regard, at first, we discuss the main characteristics of the Brazilian and 
South Korean economic development from a historical perspective, which points out 
to significant State intervention through conducting and planning the industrialization 
processes. Brazilian polices to support internationalization are not as intensive as in South 
Korea. The comparative study of the two countries demonstrated that the outcome of 
the performance of international integration is a result of driving the industrialization 
process in each country. The outward FDI from South Korea indicates more consistent 
performance outcomes in quantitative terms, more geographic diversity, and a specific 
focus on the most technologically sophisticated sectors. Meanwhile, the Brazilian 
outward FDI has grown significantly in recent years; however it presents insufficient 
institutional support and is controlled by less sophisticated sectors.
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Resumo: O presente trabalho tem por objetivo explicar e caracterizar como a emissão de 
investimento direto estrangeiro (IDE) é tratada dentro dos padrões de desenvolvimento 
brasileiro e sul-coreano. Para tanto, primeiro faz-se um resgate, por meio de uma 
perspectiva histórica, das principais características dos processos de industrialização 
brasileiro e sul-coreano, os quais contaram com a forte atuação do Estado. As políticas 
de apoio à internacionalização brasileira não tiveram uma ação tão propositiva como 
a sul-coreana. O estudo comparativo entre os dois países mostra que o desempenho 
da inserção internacional é consequência da forma como foi conduzido o processo 
de industrialização. A emissão de IDE pela Coreia do Sul mostra um desempenho mais 
consistente em termos quantitativos, é mais diversificado geograficamente e direcionado 
aos setores mais sofisticados tecnologicamente, enquanto que a emissão de IDE pelo Brasil 
cresceu expressivamente nos últimos anos, porém conta com uma assistência institucional 
insuficiente e é comandada pelos setores menos sofisticados.
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1 Introdução
The discussion on the economic development of late capitalist industrialized 
countries is broad and relevant. The comparison between the economies of these 
groups became recurrent in the literature, which evidence that some countries 
have had better performances than others. In this economic group, Brazil and Sou-
th Korea are analyzed as to their industrialization processes, more specifically, the 
strategies selected as well as the role of the State in the process. Recently, anchored 
in the processes of productive and financial globalization, the insertion of these 
countries in the international market also .
This paper aims to carry out a comparative study of the Brazilian and South 
Korean economies in order to characterize how was the treatment for the Outward 
Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI) within each country’s development patterns. 
The role of the OFDI throughout the industrial structure construction, the actors 
involved, and the institutional framework are considered in the analysis. 
The international insertion of these two countries has begun later than in 
developed countries. While the companies of the latter have started their interna-
tionalization process with the objective of explore their competitive advantages, 
companies located in developing countries sought opportunities to improve their 
technological advantages and capabilities in the foreign market (DUNNING; KIM; 
PARK, 2008, MATTHEWS, 2006).
The institutional context, specifically public policies, plays a vital role in the 
decision to enter the international business. According to Dunning (2006), the in-
centive structure and its instruments for the development of the company are key 
factors that affect the learning capacity and the formation of the company’s ne-
tworks. In this sense, the institutions of a country can either represent an obstacle 
or an incentive to the companies’ internationalization process.
According to the Investment Development Path (IDP), a concept developed 
by Narula and Dunning (2010), as a country develops, the inward and outward FDI 
by this country change. At the beginning of a country’s industrialization process, 
as its legal, commercial, and business-training infrastructure is still in formation, 
location advantages draw transnational corporations (TNCs) to the nascent indus-
try. With the consolidation of industrialization and the establishment of incentive 
policies, local companies begin to build competitive advantages that enable their 
insertion into the international market. In the more advanced stage of industrial 
development, the formation of TNCs with permanent OFDI takes place.
Based on the IDP framework, the hypothesis that this paper brings about is 
that the patterns of industrial development set in Brazil and South Korea are diffe-
rent; therefore, they condition different performances of OFDI in these countries. 
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Nevertheless, these processes do not constitute isolated effects, considering that 
internationalization manifests itself in a context in which production expansion 
beyond frontiers becomes a peculiarity of a new industrial paradigm. 
The methodology selected for the present paper is descriptive. We use the 
deductive scientific method and develop a qualitative research to analyze the pro-
blem. We also carry out a quantitative research using common elements (varia-
bles) to measure the performance outcomes in each country. The time frame used 
on the sections of qualitative analysis goes from the 1950s, when both countries 
reached the most advanced stage of industrialization, until the first decade of the 
2000s. Quantitative analyses start in the 1980s, at the beginning of the internationa-
lization process, and going until the most recent data available.
Since Korea is often used as an instance of a country that has surpassed the 
middle-income trap (LEE, 2013; IM, ROSENBLATT, 2015; AGÉNOR, 2017), the 
objective of comparing the trajectory of the two countries is to elucidate how these 
latecomer economies – with relatively similar starting points – have constructed 
such different strategies of economic development, which in turn have had diffe-
rent performance outcomes in their current industrial structures.
For this purpose, the paper  has five sections besides this introduction; on 
the first section the pattern of economic development in Brazil and in South Korea 
is discussed; on the second section the policies to support the insertion of these 
countries into the international market are presented; the third section presents 
the main data on the performance of the Brazilian and South Korean OFDI; finally, 
on the fourth section a parallel between the Brazilian and South Korean trajectory 
is drawn as a conclusion which focuses mainly on the similarities and peculiarities 
observed.
2 Two Distinct Patterns of Economic Development
The objective of the present section is to describe the pattern of industrial de-
velopment identified in Brazil and in South Korea, with a special focus on the role 
of external capital in these processes.
2.1 Foreign Capital in the Brazilian Industrialization Process
During the Brazilian economic development, the agro-export model  was re-
placed by the import substitution industrialization (ISI), responsible for transferring 
the economy’s dynamic center from the external sector, to focus on the internal 
market driven by both private and public investments. The economy then focused 
on inward development, and the export base remained unaltered and lacking dy-
namism. The new industrialization model contemplated the internal market inter-
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nationalization in a way that ended up intensifying the country’s dependence on 
external resources and technology (TAVARES, 1977; FONSECA, 2003).
Until the 1950s, the Brazilian industry intensified the use of its installed ca-
pacity and deepened the process of import substitution. The development of the 
capital goods industry began with the government’s “Plano de Metas” (1956-1961), 
which -due to the absence of domestic resources and the loss of revenue from the 
exports of primary goods- was financed by the incorporation of foreign savings, 
international loans, and policies of attraction of TNCs (LESSA, 1983).
The consolidation of the Brazilian industrial structure  occurred in the “II Pla-
no Nacional de Desenvolvimento” (II PND) (1975-1979), which aimed to strength-
en the heavy industry, and to deepen external economic relations with diversifica-
tion of the export agenda, investments in technological capacitation, and demands 
for technology transfer to TNCs. However, few of these goals were achieved, and 
contradictorily, the entry of FDI increased, as well as privileged access to the mar-
ket, granting profitability to the TNCs (LESSA, 1988).
Brazil’s external debt grew with foreign loans. The intensification of the debt 
come with the oil shocks of the 1970s that culminated in the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
The debt crisis resulted in the disorganization of public finances, which led to infla-
tionary instability and the distancing from the FDI input. Foreign capital began to 
reformulate its insertion in the periphery and started to look for other regions, such 
as Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Brazilian economy lost dynamism, failing to adapt 
to the emerging technological paradigms (CARNEIRO, 2002; COUTINHO, 1999).
During 1955-1980, the country managed to start a catching-up process with 
the international production standard. However, due to the economy’s severe 
instability after 1980, international capital was discontinued for the industrialization 
function, and the dynamic core of the Brazilian production structure came across 
technological barriers to its productivity, starting a falling behind theprocess that 
extends to the present days (AREND, 2009).
Therefore, during the Brazilian industrial structure formation, the greatest 
presence of foreign affiliates occurred in the more dynamic sectors of economic 
activity – transport materials, nonmetallic minerals, pharmaceuticals, machinery 
and equipment, and electrical material – and denser in terms of technology use 
and skilled workforce (HIRATUKA, 2002; CURADO; CRUZ, 2008). The growth of 
domestic competition reflected positively on the exports of Brazilian companies, 
which were compensated by the increased imports from subsidiaries.
The 1990s marked the intensification of economic liberalization, which in 
Brazil coincided with the adoption of orthodox macroeconomic policies that result-
ed in the loss of links in the productive chain, and in the reduction of technological 
capacity. Even after the modernization and restructuring of industrial production 
stimulated by the foreign competitive pressure due to the aforementioned liberal-
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ization, and even after significant improvement in macroeconomic conditions and 
expansion of investments and exports, Brazil fell short on the possibility of catching 
up due to its weak technological base and international insertion. 
In the 2000s, the Brazilian government resumed the insertion of industrial 
policies in its agenda: “Política Industrial, Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior” (PI-
TCE) (2003), “Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo” (PDP) (2008) and “Plano 
Brasil Maior” (PBM) (2011). Although several actions and programs were imple-
mented to promote the strengthening of the national industry in the period, a struc-
tural change did not take place, meaning that foreign technological dependence 
was remnant (CARNEIRO, 2002; CANO; SILVA, 2010). The orientation of the mac-
roeconomic stability policy - short term – surpassed the structuring industrial policy 
– long term.
In all development plans, the inflow of foreign capital was based on a stimu-
lus policy, which did not require counterparts from investors to the detriment of 
privileged access to the Brazilian market. With the economic opening, changes 
in the regulatory framework that facilitated the entrance of foreign capital were 
even more intense1. Due to these changes, foreign investment entry had consistent 
growth as of the 1990s. The studies of Carneiro (2002) and Laplane et. al. (2001) 
list some features of the FDI newcomer to the Brazilian economy, showing that the 
growing volume of investment was followed by an absolute and relative expansion 
of the remittance of profits and dividends. It is worth mentioning that the inflow of 
investment occurs through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in greater proportion 
than in greenfield projects. Inbound investments have focused on services and 
non-currencies activities, such as energy, gas and water, postal services, telecom-
munications and financial intermediation, to the detriment of investments in indus-
try and agriculture that were limited to a lesser extent.
2.2 Foreign Capital in the South Korean Industrialization Process
South Korea presented an economy strongly dependent on the agricultural 
sector and controlled by the Japanese landowners elite until the year of its 
independence, 1947. In the first democratic government that lasted until 1960, the 
first non-durable goods industries were formed, and important institutional reforms 
were implemented. Under the United States (US) pressure, a broad agrarian 
and educational reform for basic education development was implemented 
(COUTINHO, 1999).2 It is noteworthy that agrarian reform was the first step 
1 Stimulating financial market applications, eliminating restrictions on remittances of profits (the 
minimum incidence of 25% on the amount sent to the sole aliquot of 15%) and reducing income 
tax on them, giving access to sectors of economic activity and credit in official agencies (LAPLANE 
et al., 2001).
2 The US had a major influence on South Korea’s industrialization process, so the term “invited 
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towards building the foundation of a fairly egalitarian income distribution, which 
has characterized South Korea’s socioeconomic development. Similarly, the 
educational reform and South Korean commitment to improve the professional 
qualification of workers throughout their development trajectory are perceived as 
important contributions to the country’s technological progress.
As of the 1960 decade, South Korea adopted a state-orchestrated indus-
trial development trajectory through five-year social and economic growth 
plans. Among the objectives of these plans are the strong government interven-
tion in pricing, and the development of large business conglomerates, called chae-
bol.3 The selectivity of ISI remained in the early years of the decade; however, over 
time, the main strategy became the export-oriented industrialization (EOI).
In the early stage of South Korea’s economic development during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the chaebol had the government’s exclusive support and protection that 
enabled economic growth through monopolistic access to resources. Through its 
access to capital, the State was in a position to orchestrate chaebol activities. At the 
same time, the government was dependent on the chaebol to attain transformation 
and industrial development (NICOLAS; THOMSEN; BANG, 2013).
A striking feature of the South Korean industrialization process has been the 
strong management and planning the state carried out through uninterrupted de-
velopment plans. The first Five-Year Economic Development Plan (FYEDP) (1962-
1966) laid the foundations for South Korea’s industrial structure. In the second 
FYEDP (1967-1971) not only did the government include the EOI strategy, but it 
also established economic institutions to assist political and economic coordination 
(DALL’ACQUA, 1991). Thus, outward industrialization begins to materialize, based 
on the indispensability of planning the expansion of exports to mitigate external 
imbalance.
In the third FYEDP (1972-1976) the government changed the direction of its 
economic policy and introduced in 1973 the Heavy and Chemical Industries Plan. 
The fourth FYEDP (1977-1981) maintained its policies to foster the transformation 
of the industrial structure with the increase of investments in the heavy and chemi-
cal industries, and with the development of Science and Technology (S&T). In the 
early 1980s, South Korea’s macroeconomic context was marked by low growth, 
industrialization” is used in the literature. This term was first mentioned by Wallerstein (1979) to 
describe a post-war formation of East Asian capitalism through the deployment of the US power 
in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender in 1945, in order to rebuild a regional economy. In the 
case of South Korea and other countries such as Taiwan and Vietnam, the construction of a new 
capitalist state was carried out through military occupations, interventions and, fundamentally, 
through the provision of massive levels of financial aid.
3 According to Coutinho (1999), chaebol constitutes a replica of the old zaibatsu (Japanese business 
conglomerates). They are characterized by family control, centralized management of entrepre-
neurs and, above all, the interest of maintaining cooperative relations with the government to 
obtain the incumbency of new businesses, benefiting from the corresponding incentives.
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external debt increase and inflation. Thus, the fifth FYEDP (1982-1986) brought a 
series of policies to encourage exports as a strategy to leverage economic growth 
and expand reserves (MASIERO, 2000; LEE, 2011).
The sixth FYEDP (1987-1991) had as focus international efficiency and com-
petitiveness through market liberalization. The following political reforms were lib-
erally oriented, since they included the reduction of State regulation, the liberaliza-
tion of the financial market and imports, among other measures (MASIERO, 2000; 
LEE, 2011). Nevertheless, financial liberalization did not remove the character of 
lender of last resort from the State, according to Canuto (1994a).
As of 1990, in the context of the seventh FYEDP (1992-1996), a reorientation 
of S&T policy took place in order to support the expansion of spending on Re-
search and Development (R&D), that would enable the country to operate on the 
technological frontier, and also to adopt an innovation policy that emphasized an 
approach oriented to program diffusion (LEE, 2005; LEE; YOON, 2010).
In 1997, Asian countries, especially those in the Southeast region, were af-
fected by a severe economic crisis. To overcome it as quickly as possible, the gov-
ernment adopted policies to promote FDI inflows, such as the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Act in 1998 (KIM; HWANG, 2000). Lee (2011) describes that overcom-
ing the crisis was only possible with the help of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) that made drastic recommendations to the country, such as the adoption of 
higher interest rates, tax increase and reduction of public spending. In the period 
of 1998-2003, the government also conducted a business reform, through which 
the exchange of the weakened chaebol with stronger companies occurred. In the 
period of 2008-2013, economic recovery policies were included in the Five Year 
Green Growth Plan (UNEP, 2010).
An important feature of South Korea’s economic development process was 
the way through which the State raised the funds needed to implement the actions 
of the Plans, in which the low participation of foreign capital in the consolidation of 
its industrial complex is noteworthy. During the light industrialization phases, most 
investments were generated internally; however, when the process advanced to 
heavy industry, external capital took over. In the 1970s, sources of external financ-
ing accounted for approximately 70% of the total, according to Canuto (1994a). Un-
til the 1980s, the government approved the entry of FDI to even out the Balance 
of Payments and to provide the necessary technology and expertise; thus, external 
resources were welcome in the export sectors of light industries. However, inward 
FDI continued to be discouraged in sectors still protected by import substitution, 
as the South Korean government feared that the economy would be dominated by 
foreign firms (KIM; HWANG, 2000).
Considering that the State was the main borrower and distributor of external 
capital, it was able to channel loans to the infrastructure and other state-owned 
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enterprises. The industrial distribution of public loans implies that the State had au-
tonomy in the decision to allocate such resources. Otherwise, public lending could 
have been invested in sectors in which private initiative has been most active; for 
example, in the industrial and service sectors.
2.3 Differences between the Industrialization Processes in Brazil and South Korea
The strategies adopted in Brazil and South Korea throughout their industria-
lization processes have resulted in different economic performances. In South Ko-
rea, ISI was combined with EOI, for companies to have the protection of the do-
mestic market while receiving export subsidies. In Brazil, ISI was not accompanied 
by EOI, nor by measures to enhance domestic production efficiency. By adopting 
the EOI strategy, South Korea has gradually been exposed to foreign competition 
and, consequently, the country followed technological changes. Meanwhile, the 
country helped to overcome the foreign exchange constraint without over-reliance 
on external funds. South Korean exports, comprised mostly of manufactured goo-
ds, have evolved in technological intensity with the consolidation of the industrial 
process, resulting in a reduction of the trade deficit. In Brazil’s ISI strategy, produc-
tion employed lagged technologies with no private pressure to update due to a 
protectionist regulatory framework. As the ISI process became more intense, the 
dependence on the external sector when it comes to capital goods did too. Brazil 
is currently a traditional exporter of primary goods, given its abundance of natural 
resources, which, combined with the ISI, leads to the deterioration of the terms of 
trade (CANUTO, 1994a, 1994b).
In South Korea, subsidies were granted to chaebol under government con-
trol, so that inefficient firms with poor export performances lost the benefit. In this 
sense, the strategy of technological catching up and capitalist development follo-
wed specific management measures that did not result in political destabilization. 
The action of the State could not be contested, since there was no social inter-
mediate class with capacity for reaction. This homogeneity is probably due to the 
agrarian reform carried out at the beginning of the industrialization process. In 
Brazil, incentives were received by companies without being subject to performan-
ce controls, for the implementation of industrial policies was not compatible with 
the configuration of political power. The divergent interests of the powerful rural 
oligarchies, the industrial elite and the population have prevented the advance of 
more effective industrial and social policies.
It is important to note that by the end of the 1970s both countries had more 
economic similarities than differences. Both Brazil and South Korea came from a 
fast-growing trajectory and were in the process of consolidation of their industrial 
complex. As Carneiro (2002) explains, the Brazilian industry was more complex 
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and structured than the South Korean, aside from the superiority of the latter in 
technical-scientific personnel employed by companies, and the predominance of 
domestic companies with restrictive foreign collaboration. These characteristics 
were crucial in determining the countries’ economic trajectories during the follo-
wing years.
The emergence of a new organizational paradigm, the diffusion of informa-
tion technologies based on microelectronics, and financial globalization marked 
the evolution of capitalism in the 1980s. Thus, Coutinho (1999) states that the way 
each country has gone through the 1980s was the great turning point for these 
economies. In the Brazilian case, the abusive interest rate charged by the FED 
between 1979 and 1982 culminated in a debt crisis, which resulted in the disor-
ganization of public finances, which in turn led to inflationary instability and to a 
IFDI drift. Due to the decrease in investments and the difficult access of Brazilian 
exports to developed markets, the Brazilian economy lost dynamism by not adap-
ting to technological and organizational changes. In addition, Brazil stayed away 
from the trade relations that were formed with the constitution of regional trade 
blocs, especially with the intensification of intra-industry trade and intra-firm trade. 
Considering all these obstacles, the Brazilian government was unable to coordinate 
and elaborate policies for the emergence of a microelectronic complex.
In the Korean case, the strategic alliance with Japan helped overcome the 
economic crisis through Korean access to resources from Japanese banks, and 
through the partnering with Japanese microelectronics companies to qualify the 
Korean workforce. In search of having privileged relations with the US, Korean tra-
de policy focused on the American market, obtaining a growing trade surplus. The 
IFDI intensified its entry into the advanced technology sectors in response to the 
market liberalization measures and rapid economic recovery (CANUTO, 1994a; 
COUTINHO, 1999).
Therefore, Korea’s industrial proximity to Japan, especially during the shift in 
the technology paradigm during the 1980s can be seen as an element of a gradual 
catching-up stage, according Lee and Malerba (2017). This path-following strategy 
in which the latecomer moves along the same technical trajectories as the incum-
bent but at lower costs, has demonstrated beneficial outcomes. This way, South 
Korean companies were able to respond to a window of opportunity that emerged 
with the new technological paradigm, thus reaching the forging-ahead stage of 
catching-up cycles.
These events were important for South Korea to overcome the middle-inco-
me trap: South Korean GDP per capita, which was USD 284 in 1970, reached USD 
6,293 in 1990, while the Brazilian GDP increased from USD 367 in 1970, to USD 
2,687 in 1990 (UNCTAD, [2016]). Therefore it is possible to say that the two coun-
tries entered the 1990s going on opposite directions. South Korea’s quick recovery 
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provided the capacity to maintain its industrial development plans, while Brazil 
abandoned its plans and directed efforts towards economic stabilization plans. 
Thus, the former succeeded in terms of catching-up, and the latter started to go on 
a falling behind process.
Considering the context of the evolution of the productive structure in Brazil 
and in South Korea, the next section describes how the development of specific su-
pport policies to the insertion into the external market took place in both countries.
3 Policies to Support the Insertion into the International Market
In this section, we described the Brazilian and Korean policies to support 
their insertions into the international market by OFDI. Over the industrializa-
tion process, the government of both countries sets fiscal and credit incentives, 
foreign capital control, financial and non-financial instruments related to foreign 
investments.
3.1 Policies to Support the Brazilian Insertion into the International Market
The internationalization process of Brazilian companies can be understood 
with the distinction of two moments: the first occurs in the period prior to the eco-
nomic liberalization concomitant to the industrialization process. In this case, the 
State’s action in favor to the Brazilian OFDI was less proactive. Consequently, the 
second moment occurs after liberalization. During this period, occur the imple-
mentation of active policies to encourage Brazilian OFDI.
In the late 1960s, the Brazilian government adopted an export promotion 
policy consisting of fiscal and credit incentives aiming to counteract price distor-
tions derived from a lagging industry; such incentives had direct impact on price 
formation. This policy resulted in an increase in industrial exports, which was follo-
wed by an increase in the participation of Brazilian companies in international in-
vestments. According to Guimarães (1986), during the period that goes from 1977 
to 1982, 123 industrial companies invested abroad, but only 63 of them invested 
significant amounts (over US $ 100 thousand).
Oil shocks and the debt crisis in the 1980s imposed the need to adjust the 
economy’s external sector, and the government changed its incentive policy for 
foreign fund management. This change of instruments could not stimulate the evo-
lution and maturation of Brazilian companies’ internationalization; rather it gene-
rated foreign currencies to meet the international commitments expressed in the 
payment of the external debt (GOULART; BRASIL; ARRUDA, 1996).
Through economic liberalization early in the 1990s, Brazilian companies de-
monstrated more consistent internationalization processes, motivated by the remo-
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val of tariff and non-tariff barriers and monetary stabilization. The more significant 
involvement with the international market took place as a strategy of protection 
against the competition of foreign products in the domestic market, which was also 
a way of increasing competition in the international market (GOULART; BRASIL; 
ARRUDA, 1996).
In the context of the industrial policy of the Collor/Itamar Franco period from 
1990 to 1994, the Política Industrial e de Comércio Exterior (PICE) proposed a policy 
of trade liberalization and the encouragement of domestic competition, elimina-
ting state intervention in industrial development, contrary to the ISI. The govern-
ment of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1995-2002) remained with the same 
liberal orientation of previous years when the absence of industrial policies was 
placed at the core of the regulatory state.
The first movements related to the governmental incentive to the internatio-
nalization of Brazilian companies were seen in the second FHC government. Ricu-
pero and Barreto (2007) point out that, in the early 2000s, studies were carried out 
to examine the need for the creation of a Brazilian OFDI promotion agency, which 
did not succeed, and of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES, in Portuguese, Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) 
which executes government programs.
BNDES’ support for Brazilian companies’ internationalization via OFDI was 
restricted until 2002; before that year, it is possible to identify support for export 
companies. Through the Decree law No. 4.418/2002, for the first time in the BN-
DES statute were included the guidelines for the creation of a line capable of sti-
mulating the insertion and strengthening of Brazilian companies in the foreign 
market through investment and project support in target countries. As Alem and 
Cavalcanti (2005) point out, the support for the internationalization of domestic 
companies should also favor the competitive integration of Brazilian companies 
into the process of Productive Globalization, and it may represent an opportunity 
for strategic investments to be made in regional integration projects.
In Lula’s governments (2003-2006 and 2007-2010), Brazil had already 
achieved stability and resumed its economic growth, and the international en-
vironment was also more favorable. Regarding foreign policies, the government 
aimed to diversify economic partnerships and expand multilateral spaces. In ad-
dition, South America was identified as important for international insertion. In 
this sense, the internationalization of companies was part of the country’s external 
strategy, in which the Brazilian Agency for the Promotion of Exports and Invest-
ments (Apex-Brasil or Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimen-
tos) and BNDES have been its instruments of stimulation (MENEZES, 2012).
In 2004, in the light of the PITCE, the government sought to expand the Bra-
zilian industrial base by improving the innovative capacity of companies. It was 
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understood as indispensable to a country that desires greater prominence in the 
international scenario to have its TNCs, considering the commercial, technological 
and political advantages related to them (SALERNO; DAHER, 2006).
Since then, support for internationalization has been a recurring theme in 
the BNDES annual reports. In 2005, BNDES approved the first financing within its 
internationalization line, which released US$ 80 million to Friboi company for the 
purchase of 85% of the Argentinian company Swift Armor SA. In 2007, the com-
mitment to export stopped being required of companies that receive financial assis-
tance from the BNDES. As of that year, the companies were obliged to contribute 
to the economic and social development of the country, according to Decree law 
No. 6.322/2007.
The PDP policy integrated the implementation of Brazilian multinational 
companies in beef, poultry, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals. The largest com-
panies representing these sectors – Friboi/JBS, Perdigão/Sadia, Aracruz, Votoran-
tim, Braskem/Quattor – were considered “national champions” and received spe-
cial attention from BNDES because of their internationalization processes (CANO; 
SILVA, 2010).
In the same year, BNDES created its International Area (AINT), which is re-
sponsible for attracting foreign funds and for structuring the funds directed to the 
Brazilian internationalization. With the purpose of coordinating internationaliza-
tion activities of Brazilian companies, an office was opened in Montevideo, Uru-
guay, to assist Mercosul-related businesses, and a subsidiary office was opened in 
London, England, as a non-financial holding company (investment holding com-
pany) (BNDES, 2008). BNDES also supported internationalization in 2009, through 
the creation of BNDESPar, which aims to support the capitalization, development, 
the consolidation and the internationalization processes of Brazilian companies 
(BNDES, 2011).
The PBM policy also included support to the internationalization. Among 
their proposals, national and multinational companies would be the objective of 
an industrial development policy, with special sectoral regimes to support produc-
tion and technological development, the elaboration of a professional qualification 
program, export promotion, and defense of the domestic market.
Table 1 lists BNDES’ funds directed to internationalization operations and the 
Brazilian OFDI flow. It was observed that there was an evolution in BNDES’ par-
ticipation, which in 2005 financed 3% of the total of investments, and 15% in 2010. 
However, negative flows prevent BNDES’ participation in future years. In absolute 
terms, BNDES’ funds decreased significantly in 2011, 2012 and 2013 when com-
pared to other years. According to the Bank’s annual reports, disbursements for 
foreign trade and internationalization have not reached the expectations in recent 
years, what is explained by the unfavorable international economic environment.
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Table 1 – Financial support by BNDES to Brazilian TNCs, 2005-2013, in US $ million
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Financial 
support by 
BNDES1 
(A)
79 446 628 2,028 395 1,735 4 7 383
Flow of 
Brazilian 
OFDI (B)
2,517 28,202 7,067 20,457 -10,084 11,588 -1,029 -2,821 -3,496
(A)/(B)2 3% 2% 9% 10% - 15% - - -
Source: BNDES (2014) and Banco Central do Brasil (2016).
Note: 1 Converted from Real to US Dollar by the average annual exchange rate provided by 
the Central Bank of Brazil. 2 Negative flows prevent calculation of participation.
Of the R$ 10.8 billion total disbursed by BNDES between 2005 and 2013, 
81.4% went to companies in the agroindustrial sector, and the mining, chemical 
and petrochemical industries each received 7.7% of the resources. North America 
(42.7%), Latin America (11.1%) and Europe (6.7%). Regarding the nature of the 
operations, 91% had the acquisition operations and 9% greenfield, according to 
BNDES Internationalization Operations Report (2014).
3.2 Policies to Support the South Korean Insertion into the International Market
During the process of state-led industrial development, the dominant para-
digm was an ideological dichotomy in which capital inflows, exports, and national 
ownership were favored in detriment of the OFDI, imports, and foreign owner-
ship. The former were stimulated, while the latter were largely restrained. Mean-
while, the South Korean government’s export-led growth strategy paved the way 
for the Korean OFDI.
Kwak (2007) argues that the Korean OFDI can be characterized in five phas-
es.  In the first phase (1968-1985) in accordance with the overseas-oriented devel-
opment strategy, the government allowed domestic firms to invest overseas. How-
ever, the Korean OFDI levels remained insignificant until 1980. For that reason, 
until the middle of 1980, 400 cases involving the Korean OFDI to the amount of 
US$ 274 million were requested and 352 cases representing US$ 145 million were 
recorded.
Despite the institutionalization aid to internationalization, there was still 
the fear that investments abroad would worsen the Balance of Payments’ deficit 
as well as divert domestic investments. The branches could not have amounts 
over US$ 10,000 abroad, and were required prior authorization from the Bank 
of Korea. Therefore, the permits to make investments in foreign markets were 
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authorized and executed only for activities that could contribute to the policy of 
promoting exports and obtaining raw materials, since domestic production was 
hampered by the increasing lack of resources (LEE, 2011).  
In 1978, the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) was created, starting its op-
eration only in 1981, which simplified the regulation of OFDI, relaxed the prereq-
uisites for foreign investment (allowed accumulation of profits from US$ 10,000 up 
to US$ 50,000), and encouraged some industrial subsectors (PATTNAIK; KWON, 
2006). During the period of 1980-1985, Korean OFDI income those returned to the 
country was 44% of these investments and, in the later stage (1986-1989) came to 
14%, which reflects the policy adopted, according to the Bank of Korea ([2015]).
The second phase of the Korean OFDI was triggered by a change in national 
and international environments in the late 1980s. On the one hand, developed 
economies were moving towards market liberalization; on the other hand, at 
the domestic level the economy showed rapid increases in wages as inputs di-
minished competitive advantages in addition to the appreciation of Won. These 
factors pressured the greater mobility of the South Korean investments. According 
to Pattnaik and Kwon (2006), during 1986-1990, some processes required to access 
the Korean OFDI were even more simplified. This phase also marks a change in 
the investment pattern. Firstly, the Korean OFDI industry started to have greater 
participation that came to be even higher than the investment in the primary sec-
tor and services in some years; the country also increased participation in the most 
intensive technological activities. Secondly, North America was the main destina-
tion of the Korean OFDI flows, both in relation to the total of investments, and to 
industrial investments’ total, according to Korea Eximbank (2014).
The search for equilibrium in the Balance of Payments was the government’s 
main focus between 1990 and 1997, which concurrently also promoted economic 
liberalization. In the beginning of the period, the OFDI was used as an instrument 
of the economic policy for the technological improvement of the country’s indus-
tries, and to generate foreign exchange. Thus, the role of government was gradu-
ally moving from regulator to supporter of the Korean OFDI, emphasizing both 
direct and in the portfolio investments abroad to ensure currency reserves for the 
country (LEE, 2005; LEE, 2011).
Kwak (2007) describes that during the 1990s the globalization strategy of 
South Korean companies accelerated the exit from investments, which character-
izes the third phase of the Korean OFDI (1990-1997). In accordance with the gov-
ernment’s industrial policy, the major domestic conglomerates embarked on ambi-
tious globalization strategies to increase their share of production and sales abroad. 
The chaebol tried to catch up with the global leaders through their access to high 
technology from abroad and through the establishment of extensive international 
production systems.
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During the six-year period starting in 1991, the South Korean government ad-
opted three policies directed to the OFDI: i) using the Korean OFDI as an industrial 
policy and as a tool to control currency management; ii) becoming less regulatory 
of foreign investment in order to establish support mechanisms to expand the inter-
nationalization of companies; and, iii) reviewing parts of the investment regulatory 
system in order to overcome the deficit of the balance of payments and restrict 
domestic deindustrialization (PATTNAIK; KWON, 2006).
The fourth phase of the Korean OFDI pointed out by Kwak (2007) took place 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the year in which investments decreased 
significantly. South Korean companies have gone through an extensive process of 
post-crisis restructuring, which included measures such as closing foreign subsid-
iaries and the cancellation or postponement of investment plans due to liquidity 
problems. Regarding regulations, Pattnaik and Kwon (2006) indicate that Korean 
OFDI liberalization policies signaled a simplification of required investments and 
also permitted banks to issue currency for FDI. As a result, many creditor banks 
affiliated with chaebol and holdings were designated as currency manipulation 
banks.
In 1999, the government increased its incentive to Korean TNCs and 
the Korea Eximbank began to support funding for foreign investment with funds 
established for domestic currency. A larger amount and extent of financial aids 
from banks and financial institutions for overseas subsidiaries were granted in 
2001. Although financial support for TNCs has migrated to the private sector dur-
ing the 1990s -which encouraged conglomerates to create their own banks-, the 
government kept monitoring the activities of oversea subsidiaries.
The fifth stage of the Korean OFDI is evident as of 2003, according to Kwak 
(2007), when the economy recovered from the crisis and investments started to 
increase. According to Lee (2011), more deregulation in international financial 
transactions took place in 2005.
In 2007, the Policy Support for Korean companies was adopted to boost in-
vestments abroad in order to transform South Korea into one of the strongest for-
eign investors in the world. To attain this goal, the Committee for Operations in 
Global Business was established (NICOLAS; THOMSEN; BANG, 2013). Current 
Korean OFDI support policies have three ways of execution: i) lending programs: 
a line funded by Korea Eximbank covering up to 80% of the operation, and a line 
financed by the Economic Development Cooperating Fund applied to developing 
countries with long-term returns; ii) provision of information: featuring agencies 
such as Korea Eximbank and the Investment Promotion Agency and Foreign 
Trade; and, iii) non-commercial risk reduction programs: offered by the Korea Ex-
port Insurance Corporation, and Investment Protection Agreements signed by the 
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government with over 80 countries, and taxation agreements signed with over 70 
countries (KIM; RHE, 2009 apud RUPPERT; BERTELLA, 2010). 
Table 2 – Financial support by Korea Eximbank for Korean TNCs, 2000-2010, US$ million
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Finan-
cial 
support 
by 
Korea 
Exim-
bank1 
(A)
34 116 336 661 877 1,334 2,251 3,179 4,206 3,409 6,630
Korean 
OFDI 
flow 
(B)
4,233 2,029 2,920 3,971 5,643 6,359 11,175 19,720 20,251 17,197 19,230
(A)/(B) 1% 6% 11% 17% 16% 21% 20% 16% 21% 20% 34%
Source: Ribeiro and Ruppert (2011).
Note: 1 Converted from Won to US Dollar by the annual rate provided by Bank of Korea.
The Korea Eximbank is mainly responsible for financing the Korean OFDI. As 
shown in Table 2, this support has gained importance in the post-2000 years, and 
in 2000 the Bank’s lending amounted to only 1% of Korean OFDI flows, increasing 
to 34% in 2010.
Considering the institutional frameworks of Brazil and South Korea and the 
policies to encourage the internationalization of these countries, the next section 
presents data on the performance of Brazilian and South Korean OFDI.
4 The Performance of Outward Foreign Direct Investments
In this section, we select a variety of secondary data to show the evolution 
of Brazilian and Korean OFDI. The data are released by official institutions in both 
countries and relate to OFDI’s share of GDP, countries and industries destination 
of the OFDI.
4.1 Brazilian Outward Foreign Direct Investment Performance
Until 1980, as Guimarães (1986) affirms, there was no movement towards the 
internationalization of Brazilian companies. The main investments abroad were 
from the financial sector, engineering companies or the state-owned Petrobras. At 
this stage, several companies had already set up representation, storage, distri-
bution and/or technical assistance offices in the countries that were their main 
export destinations (BNDES, 1995; DIAS, 1994). Among the few cases of produc-
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tive investment, most were motivated by the proprietary advantages appropriate 
to developing markets. As in the cases of Caloi, Gradiente, Villares, and Ferraz de 
Andrade, companies that operated in Latin American countries to exploit their ad-
vantages of owning technologies adapted to the needs of these markets and were 
favored by cultural similarities (LOPEZ, 1999).
Dias (1994), Goulart, Brasil and Arruda (1996), BNDES (1995), Lopez (1999) 
indicate that as of the mid-1980s an internationalization process could already be 
evidenced. The international insertion became one of the strategic guidelines for 
Brazilian companies, influenced by sector specificities. In the resource-intensive 
sectors, investments focused on the opening of commercial offices, since the avai-
lability of raw materials in Brazil explains the highly internationalized behavior of 
the sector from the point of view of exports. Some instances are the food and be-
verage industries (Sadia, Perdigão, Copersucar and Brahma) and paper mills, and 
their relationship with the Latin American market (LOPEZ, 1999; DIAS, 1994).
Regarding the capital goods sector, the installation of new production plants 
was reduced to a minimum; exporting companies in the area (Villares, Weg Moto-
res, Fupresa, Nardini) resorted to the installation of after-sales service offices, inclu-
ding testing plants and equipment recovering. The textile and clothing industries 
have sought to expand oversea business to better customer contact and enlarge 
trading margins. Some companies (Artex, Hering, São Paulo Alpargatas, Staroup) 
installed small-scale production plants in Europe, mainly in Spain and Portugal, 
and in the US (DIAS, 1994).
Lopez (1999) points out that the sector whose internationalization process 
has progressed to a greater extent both quantitatively and qualitatively was the 
auto parts sector. Since the 1980s, some companies (Cofap, Freios Vargas, Me-
tal Leve, Sabó) have opened offices to handle their sales in the US and Europe, 
which enabled the quick delivery of parts and increased the purchase orders. The 
transformations in the logic of the automotive industry with the introduction of 
toyotist methods and other technological and organizational innovations, besi-
des the intention to avoid any protectionist barriers -added to the high cost of 
transportation in relation to the unit value of the product-, influenced the deci-
sion to internationalize the production of auto parts. The internationalization of 
Brazilian auto parts companies culminated in the absorption of these by TNCs in 
developed countries. In a later period, the creation of Mercosul also influenced 
the internationalization’s intensification of the sector, as it introduced a process of 
specialization and commercial exchange of the productive units in Brazil and in 
Argentina.
The steel sector was also one of the most significant instances of the Brazilian 
OFDI in the beginning of the country’s internationalization process. The compa-
nies Gerdau and Usiminas acquired plants abroad with the objective of establishing 
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competitive advantages in regional markets (DIAS, 1994). The mining company 
Vale was also one of the Brazilian OFDI great participants. Its internationalization 
began even before the company’s transition from state-owned to private, with the 
purchase of plants in the US and France. After the company’s privatization this 
process intensified (LOPEZ, 1999).
During the 1990s, two opposing forces influenced foreign investment. On the 
one hand, as a result of macroeconomic stability was the expansion of the inter-
nal market accompanied by an exchange rate that was in a recovery process and 
the hard currency shortage. On the other hand, the economic opening narrowed 
competition and encouraged the internationalization process of some companies. 
Thus, if in 1990 internationalization was a response to the events of the moment, 
in the post-2000 period an active interest is noted in consolidating this process, 
when the expansion of the geographic distribution of the Brazilian OFDI took pla-
ce, changing motivations and strategies.
Comparing the Brazilian OFDI previous and post the economic opening a 
significant advance is observed in the internationalization process. According to 
Coutinho, Hiratuka and Sabatini (2008), the new international insertion strategies 
facilitate the expansion of the market by leveraging competitive capabilities, and 
also by providing access to the resources needed for local companies to face global 
competition. Similarly, companies have adopted the international expansion as a 
condition of long-term ability to compete. Macroeconomic conditions were also a 
contributing factor, since the facilitated access to credit, inflation control and the 
equilibrium in the balance of payments would allow the maintenance of domestic 
profitability and the provision of funding.
In the 1990s the initial outward investments were concentrated in the Mer-
cosul countries, as a result of the opening of the economy during the integration 
process. These investments were led by the steel industry, by the intermediate 
goods, and by the transport equipment sectors. Regarding the last sector, com-
panies identified internationalization as the way to take part in global production 
networks, especially in the auto parts industry. Demanding markets such as the US 
also pressured the growth of manufactured products exports, encouraging oversea 
production (IGLESIAS; VEIGA, 2002).
The stock of the Brazilian OFDI did not exceed US$ 50 billion in 2000; from 
then on, significant increases over the years took place. In 2004 the investments 
increased 26% and 44% in 2006, comparing to the year before. However, the ratio 
between the stock investment and the Brazilian GDP had a downward trajectory, 
showing that even with a significant growth of the Brazilian OFDI, its growth was 
lower than expected, considering the domestic economic growth, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.
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Figure 1 – The Brazilian OFDI stock and its GDP share, Brazil, 1980-2014
Source: UNCTAD ([2016]).
Investments made after the 2000s were directed to Europe, North America 
and Latin America, in addition to tax havens. In Table 3 are listed the main coun-
tries receiving the Brazilian OFDI since 2001. Major resources in recent years are 
responsible for putting Austria as the main destination of the Brazilian OFDI. This 
refers to the investments in the mining industry led by a subsidiary of Vale installed 
in that country in 2007, which conducts research in the area. The Netherlands 
received significant amounts of Brazilian investments since 2004, mainly related to 
Petrobras, however that country is also a tax heaven. However, in the last three ye-
ars the country stood out in the manufacturing industry, besides receiving Braskem 
investments. Spain, Argentina and the US can be considered traditional destina-
tions for Brazilian investments due to constant flows. Correa and Lima (2008) point 
out that since 2002 Brazil has become the biggest international investor in Argen-
tina. Investments in Spain have reached 3.8% of the total received by the country 
in 2001, and investments in the US represent 1.5% of the total received by the 
country.
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Table 3 – The Brazilian OFDI1 stock main destination countries, Brazil, average of 
2001-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2012, 2013-2014, US$ million
Rank País
2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2014
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
1 Austria 151 0 1,625 2 32,905 21 47,693 22 59,584 20
2 Nether-lands 565 1 2,496 3 2,806 2 20,504 9 32,826 11
3 Luxem-burgo 1,019 2 3,578 4 4,535 3 8,546 4 19,401 7
4 Spain 2,144 4 3,522 4 4,905 3 12,182 6 17,892 6
5 Argen-tina 1,688 3 2,035 2 3,488 2 5,853 3 6,105 2
6 Peru 52 0 278 0 517 0 2,404 1 3,149 1
7 Canada 253 0 38 0 449 0 1,896 1 745 0
8 Mexico 85 0 160 0 630 0 909 0 1,416 0
9 Vene-zuela 32 0 106 0 442 0 967 0 2,356 1
10 Chile 182 0 748 1 481 0 866 0 1,763 1
11 USA 1,980 4 3,794 4 9,494 6 16,840 8 15,143 5
12 Colom-
bia
68 0 51 0 374 0 981 0 890 0
13 Uruguay 3,161 6 2,188 2 2,429 2 2,793 1 3,724 1
14 France 154 0 178 0 411 0 1,171 1 1,148 0
15 Italy 147 0 129 0 295 0 416 0 434 0
16 Paraguay 54 0 115 0 164 0 419 0 799 0
17 Germany 132 0 206 0 187 0 293 0 483 0
18 India 0.02 0 0 0 - - - - 39 0
19 United Kingdon 300 1 758 1 1,089 1 1,352 1 2,898 1
20 Portugal 1,005 2 942 1 1,689 1 2,841 1 3,735 1
21 Switzer-
land
40 0 54 0 312 0 479 0 1,265 0
Subtotal 13,210 25 23,002 26 67,602 44 129,404 59 161,023 55
Others 39,791 75 64,541 74 85,898 56 89,755 41 133,692 45
Total 53,001 100 87,544 100 153,500 100 219,159 100 294,715 100
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2006, 2014).
Note: 1 Including participation in capital (over 10%) and intercompany loans.
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While Asian countries had not been in the history of Brazilian investments, 
the resources allocated to countries such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, India and Japan, have grown at an average rate of 48% per annum over the 
years 2007 and 2014.
As a result of two decades without proactive industrial policy, the internatio-
nalization of Latin American faced great difficulty in entering developed markets. 
At this point, the largest corporations in Latin America, including the high-techno-
logy-intensity industries, had not been able to accumulate technological capability 
to become innovative, while Asian companies succeeded in this aspect. Major in-
vestments abroad were directed to other developing countries in the tertiary sec-
tor, natural resources-based and low-technology-intensity industries. In the context 
of globalization, these companies were also confronted by tougher competition 
from TNCs from other regions, suggesting that in order to survive, Brazilian compa-
nies would be forced to expand their activities to benefit from scale economies and 
so enhancing their competitiveness.
The data in Table 4 presents the Brazilian OFDI per industry ranked by their 
technology intensity. It is possible to observe that the Brazilian OFDI for the ma-
nufacturing industry is increasing its share total: in the 2001-2003 triennium the 
industry represented 4% of total resources and increased to 17% in the 2010-2012 
period. In the manufacturing industry, the medium-low-technology intensity – me-
tallurgy, non-metallic mineral products – had the highest growth rates, since grea-
ter proximity to the Mercosul countries affected positively this performance. Simi-
larly, but limited to a lesser extent, are the rubber and plastic products and metal 
products industries.
Table 4 – Brazilian OFDI1 position by industry, Brazil, average of 2001-2003, 2004-
2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2012, 2013-2014, US$ million
Industry
2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2014 Tech-
nology 
inten-
sity
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
Agricul-
tural, 
fishing, 
mining
683 2 2,285 3 38,365 32 58,813 29 62,466 23
Manu-
facturing 1,698 4 2,074 3 16,581 14 34,322 17 47,069 17
Food 
and Bev-
erage
152 0 398 1 9,233 8 10,538 5 17,866 7 Low
Metal-
lurgical 6 0 68 0 3,314 3 12,798 6 14,121 5
Medi-
um-low
to be continued...
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Industry
2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2014 Tech-
nology 
inten-
sity
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
Non-
metallic 
mineral 
products
244 1 22 0 1,348 1 6,692 3 9,741 4 Medi-um-low
Chemi-
cal prod-
ucts
24 0 55 0 198 0 618 0 870 0
Medi-
um-
high
Motor 
vehicles 116 0 60 0 490 0 616 0 602 0
Medi-
um-
high
Rub-
ber and 
plastic 
products
247 1 402 1 343 0 533 0 539 0 Medi-um-low
Textiles 32 0 176 0 237 0 336 0 352 0 Low
Metal 
products 138 0 538 1 162 0 195 0 287 0
Medi-
um-low
Machin-
ery and 
equip-
ment
105 0 178 0 183 0 300 0 376 0
Medi-
um-
high
Miscel-
laneous 
product
0 0 0 0 82 0 155 0 211 0 -
Leather 
products 
and foot-
wear
2 0 6 0 21 0 59 0 134 0 Low
Others 630 1 172 0 971 1 1,483 1 1,970 1
Services 41,202 95 68,027 94 64,223 54 109,921 54 161,841 60
Total 43,583 100 72,386 100 119,169 100 203,057 100 271,377 100
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2006, 2014).
Note: 1 Including the participation in capital (over 10%) and intercompany loans.
In the medium-high-technology industries, the motor vehicles industry has 
invested more in the last two terms of three years driven by the auto parts industry. 
The automotive agreement between Brazil and Argentina, and Brazil and Mexico 
also contributed to the growth of investments. The chemical industry also had an 
impressive growth rate. However, the machinery and equipment industry received 
low levels of Brazilian investments abroad.
The group of low-technology-intensity industries showed more modest gro-
wth, such as the textiles and leather goods, and footwear industries. Such industries 
conclusion.
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have suffered from foreign competition in the domestic environment and the be-
nefits of internationalization are most often insufficient. However, it is not the case 
of the food and beverage industry, in which foreign investment grew significantly. 
In addition to having the government’s financial support, this industry has a solid 
structure within the country and has ownership advantages to internationalize.
The Brazilian OFDI in high-technology-intensity industries was very small and 
it was ranked in “others”. The importance of this group is unique for any economy 
because it dictates the pace of increase of economic productivity, and it is respon-
sible for the dissemination of technical progress. Also, the internationalization of 
high-technology-intensity industries could enable a catching-up process for deve-
loping economies.
4.2 South Korean Foreign Direct Investment Performance
In general, the South Korean experience suggests that foreign investment 
is determined by several factors, both domestic and global. Considering the 
macroeconomic context, the factors that stand out are: a) high domestic wages 
in the course of industrialization encouraged labor intensive industries to seek 
for markets with lower wages; b) the domestic interest rate was used by the 
government as an instrument to promote investment in the domestic market; c) 
the exchange rate that on the one hand spurred investors to seek hard currency 
reserves, on the other hand the devaluation of the national currency made investing 
overseas more difficult; and d) the small domestic market had limited the growth 
of the chaebol , highlighting the need for external expansion. At the same time, the 
global pull factors refer to: a) the need for natural resources, as the country was 
in need of the same due to their small size; b) geographical proximity to export 
markets; iii) access to technology, as the country had a late industrialization process 
(KWAK, 2007).
Until 1985, due the restriction of government, investments were made in the 
primary industry for the development and import of raw materials in the form of 
natural resources. The Korean OFDI strategies focused on resource seeking and 
market seeking, and the main destination activities were mining and forestry and 
construction (LEE, 2011).
The OFDI Korean stock did not exceed US$ 1 billion in 1987; from then on, 
there have been significant increases over the years. In 1990, the amount invested 
was of US$ 2.3 billion and reached US$ 196.4 billion in 2012. The Korean OFDI 
expansion followed the GDP growth, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 – The Korean OFDI stock and its share of GDP, South Korea, 1980-2014
Source: UNCTAD ([2016]).
Traditional destinations for the Korean OFDI are the countries of their region. 
Investments in Asia correspond, on average, to over 40% of the total. As Rugman 
and Doh (2008) observe, the chaebol have advantages in guiding the Southeast 
Asian region arising from the business relationship between governments, local 
knowledge and benefits related to such groups. From 2004, the government ope-
ned Service Center offices for South Korean investors abroad in Beijing, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and the Netherlands (NICOLAS; THOMSEN; BANG, 2013). This initiative 
stimulated investment in these countries, as can be noted in Table 5.
61Análise Econômica, Porto Alegre, v. 38, n. 75, p. 37-72, mar. 2020.
Table 5 – Korean OFDI flow by main destination countries, South Korea, average 
of 1990-1997; 1998-2002; 2003-2007; 2008-2013, US$ million
Rank Country
1990-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2013
US$ mi % US$ mi % US$ mi % US$ mi %
1 USA 636 26 1,185 26 1,848 18 4,312 18
2 China 461 19 709 16 3,179 30 3,672 15
3 Hong Kong 99 4 269 6 691 7 1,579 7
4 Vietnam 75 3 84 2 514 5 995 4
5 United Kingdom 91 4 189 4 143 1 1,167 5
6 Nether-
lands
33 1 392 9 165 2 992 4
7 Indonesia 157 7 115 3 130 1 739 3
8 Brazil 15 1 33 1 115 1 748 3
9 Singapure 17 1 106 2 271 3 524 2
10 Malysia 43 2 36 1 77 1 593 2
11 Germany 72 3 66 1 144 1 395 2
12 India 45 2 82 2 109 1 322 1
13 Philippines 37 2 81 2 50 0 356 1
14 Mexico 17 1 28 1 58 1 297 1
15 Russia 15 1 14 0 87 1 242 1
16 Thailand 48 2 45 1 70 1 167 1
17 Poland 27 1 82 2 95 1 42 0
18 Slovak 2 0 0 0 146 1 75 0
19 Czech 
Republic
1 0 6 0 133 1 79 0
20 Turkey 6 0 10 0 36 0 122 1
Subtotal 1,897 79 3,533 77 8,061 77 17,418 72
Others 507 21 1,028 23 2,467 23 6,845 28
Total 2,404 100 4,561 100 10,529 100 24,263 100
Source: Korea Eximbank ([2014]).
The US also received much of South Korean operations due to the long pe-
riod of political and trade agreements between the countries. The flows received 
by the US have intensified in the 1990s, especially after-2000, driven by compa-
nies seeking for technological improvement. These companies were located in the 
Silicon Valley region, and received government support to improve the genera-
tion of innovation. According to Kotra ([2014]), since 2008 the number of South 
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Korean companies located in Silicon Valley has doubled from 80 to over 160 in 
2013; among these companies are Samsung, LG and Hyundai. The reasons for this 
include the search for partners for technological improvement and the search for 
a consumer market with high per capita income, since the US domestic market is 
saturated. Moreover, some Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico, 
have received more South Korean resources in recent years, which are mainly 
linked to the automotive industry.
Regarding the industry distribution of the Korean OFDI, it is observed that 
most of the resources are allocated in the manufacturing industry, coming to re-
present almost half of the OFDI total. In the last observed period (2008-2012), the 
manufacturing industry loses share at the expense of investment in the primary sec-
tor. They had steady growth in mining activity, according to Table 6. In the 1990s, 
the industrial activities that have received investments are the metalworking, che-
mical products, plastic products, rubber, textiles, and clothing industries. In the 
post-2000 years, the industries with greater technological intensity are the output 
of the OFDI. In this way, the largest investments were seen in the motor vehicles 
industry, metal products industry and communications equipment, radio and TV 
industry. Unlike in Brazil, the Korean TNCs have had greater investment abroad in 
high-technology-intensity industries.
Table 6 – The Korean OFDI distribution per industry, South Korea, average of 
1990-1997; 1998-2002; 2003-2007; 2008-2012, US$ million
Industry
1990-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012 Technol-
ogy in-
tensity
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi % US$ mi %
Agricultural, 
fishing, mining 896 11 1,581 7 3,769 7 33,122 17
Manufacturing 4,505 56 12,939 53 25,942 51 83,608 42
Motor vehicles 313 4 1,542 6 3,598 7 16,241 8 Medium-
high
Metal products 1,114 14 1,496 6 3,020 6 12,174 6 Medium-low
Radio, TV and 
communica-
tions equip-
ment
818 10 4,082 17 4,448 9 5,572 3 High
Textile and 
apparel 625 8 1,592 7 2,925 6 5,000 2 Low
Chemical 
products 221 3 429 2 2,333 5 6,557 3
Medium-
high
Machinery and 
equipment
122 2 190 1 2,036 4 3,598 2 Medium-
high
to be continued...
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Industry
1990-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007 2008-2012 Technol-
ogy in-
tensity
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi %
US$ 
mi % US$ mi %
Office, ac-
counting and 
computing 
machinery
108 1 750 3 942 2 3,960 2 High
Rubber and 
plastic prod-
ucts
228 3 652 3 1,222 2 2,976 1
Medium-
low
Food products 197 2 474 2 983 2 2,756 1 Low
Transport 
equipment 11 0 172 1 365 1 2,989 1
Medium-
high
Refined petro-
leum products 5 0 7 0 157 0 1,247 1
Medium-
low
Wood, pulp 
and paper 
products, 
printing
200 2 443 2 455 1 287 0 Low
Medical, preci-
sion and opti-
cal instrument
- - - - 310 1 1,001 0 High
Pharmaceuti-
cals products - - - - 124 0 339 0 High
Aircraft and 
spacecraft - - - - 4 0 8 0 High
Other 545 7 1,109 5 3,019 6 18,904 9
Services 2,629 33 9,748 40 20,947 41 83,735 42
Total 8,031 100 24,268 100 50,658 100 200,465 100
Source: OECD ([2014]).
Kim and Rhe (2009) list the four main strategies of Korean TNCs. Firstly were 
the factors that aimed to reduce costs (efficiency seeking) and technological le-
arning (strategy asset seeking). In the case of cost reduction, China is the major 
chosen site of the Korean OFDI because of its low cost of labor, which is, according 
to the Korea Eximbank ([2014]), about one tenth compared to the cost in South 
Korea. The second motivational factor refers to demand conditions that include 
the search market, local presence requirements, and the production of learning 
market (market seeking). Many companies seek for a foreign market to diversify the 
risk of focusing on the domestic market. As the third motivation, Korean TNCs used 
the strategy of following customers/suppliers already acquired (market seeking), as 
is the case of Hyundai Mortors, which has approximately 10% of its overseas sup-
conclusion.
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pliers, but the TNCs also seek for a favorable infrastructure and regulation (strategy 
asset seeking).
The fourth motivation relates to the strategic competitive advantages and 
the location. Taekwang Corporation invested in production facilities in Vietnam 
and hired over 10,000 Vietnamese workers, since the country is known as a place 
where labor issues are easier to manage. In terms of catching-up, Korean compa-
nies invest abroad to imitate or to compensate for the advantages of its domestic 
competitors that made previous investments abroad. For example, Samsung Elec-
tronics and LG Electronics are the two biggest competitors of the South Korean 
electronics industry and both compete internationally (KIM; RHE, 2009).
5 General Evaluation and Conclusion
The development paths followed by Brazil and South Korea have a key fea-
ture, the strong presence of the State as planner and coordinator of the industrial 
process. In contrast with this similarity, there is a central difference that stems from 
the process of internationalization in the two countries: industrial training in South 
Korea combined the State to the national capital; in Brazil, the national capital was 
supporting the internalization process.
It is considered that many factors influenced the formation of this scenario. 
One is the difference between an industrialization “invited”, such as South Korea, 
and an exploratory industrialization as was the process that took place in Brazil, in 
the sense that the TNCs that settled in Brazil throughout its industrialization process 
were interested in exploiting the consumer market and did not bring their more 
sophisticated production structures and R&D for the local development. Moreo-
ver, South Korea has benefited from the extension of Japanese production in its 
territory, so that their companies gained access to the most modern forms of pro-
duction, while in Brazil forms with no private obligation of update were used.
The way through which South Korea raised the necessary funds for the con-
solidation of its industrial complex is one of the most important factors of its develo-
pment process and it is one of the main differences from the Brazilian experience. 
The lack of dynamism in the export sector combined with low domestic savings 
and the lack of national funding sources for the Brazilian government programs did 
not leave many alternatives to the State but to promote and attract foreign capital. 
South Korea had its privileged relationship with the US as well as foreign loans that 
could be administrated by the government in development plans.
 Figure 3 shows the correlation of the ratio between the OFDI and inward 
FDI (IFDI) with the Brazilian and South Korean GDP per capita. It appears that 
the IFDI flows were higher than the OFDI flows over the years, except in 2006, in 
Brazil. However, it is possible to note that during the first year, while the per capita 
65Análise Econômica, Porto Alegre, v. 38, n. 75, p. 37-72, mar. 2020.
GDP is less than US$ 2,000 per year, this ratio was close to zero, and it has oscillatory 
features pari passu to the growth of the GDP per capita. Due to the way the Brazilian 
industrialization was conducted, in which FDI inflows had major role in some of the 
most dynamic industries, is the reason the OFDI/IFDI relation is far from being grea-
ter than 1 (one). Contrary to this experience is the situation in South Korea, in which 
the IFDI had a supporting role and was only released as the industrial process was 
consolidated. In addition, other reasons, such as the formation of large industrial con-
glomerates, investment in technology and innovation, limited internal market and the 
ordinary US aid also contributed to the reason the OFDI/IFDI relation was increasing 
at the same intensity than the evolution as the GDP per capita in South Korea.
Figure 3 – The Relationship between the flow of Outward and Inward FDI and 
GNP per capita* of Brazil and South Korea, 1970-2014
Source: UNCTAD ([2016]).
Note: Based on Dunning, Kim and Park (2008).
Regarding the internationalization process, it was observed that the inter-
national experience of South Korea was carried out in parallel with its industrial 
development. It is possible to notice an increase in the internationalization as the 
ownership advantages of national industries consolidated. In addition, the process 
created an institutional structure set with the national strategies and corporate mo-
tivations. Thus, the Korean OFDI shows a more consistent performance in quan-
titative terms, it is more geographically diverse, and directed to the most sophisti-
cated technology industries. In Brazil, the two decades were affected by internal 
instability, economic liberalization and industrial restructuring, which were not fa-
vorable to the evolution of the Brazilian OFDI. When they evolved, the persecuted 
trend was reversed in industries with less technological content. The outcomes of 
the internationalization performances are also seen among the 500 largest global 
companies, according to the Fortune ranking, in which thirteen were South Kore-
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an, and four were Brazilian in 2015. Among the 100 largest non-financial TNCs in 
developing countries, six were South Korean, one of which is also present in the lar-
gest of the developed countries, and five were Brazilian in 2016. (UNCTAD, 2018). 
Consequently, the income from the Korean OFDI was larger than the one 
from the Brazilian OFDI, as seen in Figure 4. In the South Korean case, according 
to the Bank of Korea ([2015]) the income from Korean OFDI that returned to the 
country is more consistent, which arrived at any given time, representing 44% of 
these investments (1980-1985). Unlike in Korea, the Brazilian OFDI income was re-
duced when compared to Korean investments over time, reflecting the main type 
of investment for the financial sector.
In the Brazilian case, it is noteworthy that the OFDI flows, after the 2008 crisis 
became negative and revenues show significant growth. This behavior is typical 
of the financial sector investments that are more volatile, usually contracted in the 
short term, and destined to tax havens with high risk of contagion4. Such behavior 
demonstrates the instability of the financial markets, where short-term phenomena 
are compounded by contagion effects in the medium term and affect access to 
long-term financing. Since the Korean OFDI is mostly for the industrial sector, the 
country does not have the same problem of rent loss.
Figure 4 – OFDI flows and its income1 – Brazil and South Korea, 1990-2015
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2016) and Bank of Korea ([2015]).
Note: 1Direct investment income includes Profits and dividends related to equity investments 
and Interest on intercompany loans in the form of direct loans and securities of any term. 
They do not include capital gains, classified as direct investment in the financial account.
4 In a scenery with imperfect information, the risk of contagion increases concomitantly with the 
expansion of financial-productive integration. Through contagion, the effects of a financial crisis 
extend beyond national borders, reaching economies that do not go through instability in the 
productive sector. In the current context of financialization, the determinants of capitalist accu-
mulation are governed by the preponderant role of finance, which is intrinsic to instability and 
uncertainty (LACERDA, 2003).
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Accordingly, the construction of this study reveals that the State’s role has 
unique importance in the external performance of the two countries, Brazil and 
South Korea. In the domestic environment, the State maintained an active and 
consecutive industrial policy, particularly with long-term goals, in order to iden-
tify hurdles to domestic industries’ development in the international context. It is 
necessary, considering the South Korean history, to identify the most competitive 
sectors, and focus on their technological improvement; this means to improve the 
specific advantages of the industry. Regarding the external environment, it is worth 
investing in exclusive policies for the insertion into the international market, since 
it is understood that only through internationalization can an industry establish its 
long-term competitiveness. In this regard, the policy of promoting exports of manu-
factured goods and assistance to foreign investment is necessary. It is also essential 
to the formation of specialized agencies to assist in legal proceedings, in order to 
provide a network of information about the host country, and also provide insuran-
ce instruments for the invested resources.
In this context, the present paper presents lessons can be drawn for deve-
loping active industrial and technological policy in the future. Policy formulation 
that draws on IFDI that carry the technical progress is important to bring upstream 
and downstream spillovers. As well as, develop policies that create conditions for 
the promotion of technological learning processes, since TNCs, for the most part, 
outline virtuous technological trajectories. It’s necessary to establish policies that 
choose criteria for the performance of foreign companies – export and producti-
vity – in the face of facilitating conditions – credit and taxation – for the realization 
of their investments. Adding to this scenario, developing a structuring policy that 
stimulates national and multinational private investments in line with macroeco-
nomic stability policy – control of inflation, public deficit and balance of payments. 
In addition, the development of industrial and technological policy in line with 
the creation of systemic conditions of competitiveness, in particular the social – 
education, health and housing – and the infrastructural – transport, energy and 
communication.
The present paper exposed the importance of industrial and technological 
policies for the strengthening of local companies in terms of improving technologi-
cal capabilities and international insertion. Especially for middle-income countries, 
international insertion can represent a way for companies to keep up-to-date on 
the changes in the world’s production, as well as being a way of learning about 
ongoing innovative sectoral processes, thus being prepared for possible windows 
of opportunity which will better industrial performance as a whole.
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